Hey @Eric, thanks for the clarification! It sounds reasonable what you say, and I like the idea to increase POL to help with growth 
Iād be more comfortable supporting a request for POL increase not coupled to an airdrop as that seems to incentivize people to vote yes for receiving an airdrop when they should instead be voting on funding POL increase.
Definitely worth looking into more from our endā¦ 
thatās a completely fair and just point.
Asks like this, offering nothing, have been decently commonplace on the Hub for LSD providers. We donāt want to make a habit of asking for handouts, and so like the idea of perpetual reciprocity, a fundamental value at the heart of Astrovault.
We are NOT wanting to buy votes, weāre wanting to share growth.
Similarly, we passed our AADAO grant by our own merits as a net good for the Cosmos HUB. We voluntarily chose to contribute tokens to the ATOM community pool in response to share in the growth. It was not a direct trade or investment.
Archway will benefit from Astrovaultās growth regardless. Astrovault will benefit from Archwayās growth regardless. But teamwork is SO hot right now!
This is 100% necessary! Thanks for this prop
Will xARCH holders receive the AXV airdrop too?
Essentially, xARCH holdersā balance is reflected in an equal amount of ARCH staked to the Astrovault validator., so it should be assumed they do receive it - the same as when an LSD receives airdrops on their users behalf and then forwards it to them.
it seems counter-intuitive to exclude xARCH holders, since that would incentivize users NOT to liquid stake their ARCH, wouldnāt it?
This is super interesting, thank you for bringing this up! Our initial thoughts are ānoā, as the purpose of xARCH is to use on Astrovault, not to stake in general, but it also IS users of Archway in general, and if weāre to support sARCH as well, we get it!
My thoughts are yes, but of course Iām biased towards Astrovault holders, and Iād love to get othersā input in this, as TECHNICALLY most xARCH will be in LP contracts, and so the AXV-DAO itself would earn the airdrop, but certainly could also distribute it to the pools as an additional bonus should this pass?
Happy to hear other thoughts. Totally open on this!
I like the idea of strategically aligning the community w/ important dApps in their ecosystem and I am in favor of this proposal.
My only suggested change for this proposal would be to change the above to:
Whatever is unclaimed after 6 months will be reclaimed in itās entirety by the ARCH community pool.
I think this is more fair, as unclaimed AXV in the ARCH community pool could either be redistributed to those that who did claim or can be handled in a separate manner. But, ensures that the Archway community is āproperlyā rewarded for their spend.
Also, b/c of the whale cap, what happens to the funds that would have been allocated to those wallets? Ideally, these would also be distributed to the ARCH Community Pool (if not being allocated pro-rata to other qualifying wallets).
GL AXV team!
Great question on the Whale Cap!
We WILL allocate the entire 5%. I suppose we could just do no whale cap? Idea was to make it a bit more of a fairdrop, but no whale cap would be the least gameable?
I think thatās a fair ask and concession to have all of the unclaimed funds go to the Community Pool. Solid point and ask!
If this passes then it would be a HUGE win for the Archway network and the Archway community.
Essentially this proposal offers:
This is a Win/Win/Win therefore anyone who does not support this then they do not care about the future of Archway. Astrovault has been a leading dApp on Archway and we need to continue to support their success.
For all of the reasons above I am a resounding YES and highly encourage others to support this as well.
Apologies for the late input on the forums for this proposal. I will get straight to the point and voice that WhisperNode is a no vote to the proposal as written.
We have a few concerns over how this proposal is being delivered. Below is a brief overview of some high level concerns:
We see the tying of an airdrop to proposal approval to be a concerning practice bordering on blatant bribery. Passage of such a proposal for POL should in no manner be tied to an airdrop potential for a community. Airdrops are meant to reward early adopters and to disseminate stake in a network/project to aligned individuals; not to bribe them for community pool funds.
These quote tells me that Astrovault will be soliciting other communities, and has already stated that they will prioritize those where theyāre able to succeed in pillaging community pools for bootstrap funds.
Yes, yes you are trying to buy votes or at least have the strong appearance of doing so.
First and foremost I would recommend untying airdrop conditions to proposal approval.
The proposed POL is SOLELY owned by Astrovault. They are being handed $750,000 with nothing more than a ātrust us.ā There are no multi-sigs, no contracts, no milestonesā¦nothing proposed. Regardless of what is stated because you are granting tokens you are essentially trusting the team to not sell your token and are yourselves short your own protocol token. It also seems to circumvent the purpose of the liquidity council as described here:
This differs greatly from other POL proposals we have seen recently in the Cosmos ecosystems whereby POL is jointly owned by DAOs and team treasuries/foundations. In those cases there are much better safeguards and alignment. Two examples are found here:
While we agree Astrovault offers a unique approach to liquidity preservation, we disagree that it IMPROVES network security, and if not carefully considered the model actually presents a risk to network security and decentralization.
Astrovault currently sits at validator slot #4 with 13,263,032 ARCH tokens staked and 2.92% of voting power. The addition of 5,000,000 ARCH tokens would be 18,263,032 tokens and represent somewhere around 4-5% of voting power. While this number is not necessarily concerning in and of itself (we do have 3-4% of the VP on Secret Network admittedly) the business model of Astrovault will ensure that this percentage only grows over time. It is concerning to rapidly increase the voting power of one entity with the addition of 5,000,000+ ARCH tokens; especially when it seems guaranteed to grow by design of the DEX alone.
Other Considerations:
The claim brought forward is that additional liquidity is guaranteed to help scale. I would like to see some data that backs this up. Attracting liquidity is indeed a challenge, but Iām not sure handing the liquidity to the project team is necessarily the answer weāre all looking for?
@WhisperNode I think that you have a misunderstanding of the proposal.
Characterizing this as āPillaging Community Poolsā is a harsh mischaracterization of the proposal. Your response comes off as a jealous validator with no solutions to the liquidity problem. There is Zero sell pressure. In addition, if anyone tries to swap Arch on any other dex then they incur significant slippage. Offering Liquidity helps the archway community.
Your concern of arch decentralization is self admittedly insincere.
The concern about funds not going to a multisig is mildly concerning. The total amount is only $750k and its going to a trusted dApp that is a known organization. The dApp is the most used on Archway and we should encourage growth within.
Joe Biden, vote for me and i will forgive your student loans. You name the government with free and fair elections and you can interpret āBuying Votesā in one form or another. This for me is also a non issue.
Finally, this proposal only offers all around net positives for the netowrk. It is a no brainer and has my full support.
I share WhisperNodeās concerns about an airdrop being tied to a liquidity deal. Without a token being live, itās also really hard to know whether this is a fair deal for stakers. Does a 5% airdrop for $750,000 assume that the market cap of the project will be 15M out of the gate? That does seem quite high for a new project, even if it is a promising one. It seems like it would be a much lower risk option for ARCH holders to do a POL deal, even one that could involve an airdrop, once the AVX token is live and value is established. If this is a fair deal, then there shouldnāt be much of a problem being patient and making something happen after the token is live.
I wanted to highlight one additional risk about the airdrop design in general.
In exchange, we will give 5% of our TGE as an airdrop to ARCH stakers with a whale cap.
A whale cap is completely meaningless when terms of a deal like this are publicized well in advance. Nothing stops whales from wallet splitting, and we have seen this happen on other chains in the past. Whales will win unless airdrop conditions are decently complicated or conditions are not known in advance. If you plan to target stakers from some time in the past, making this more of a surprise condition, then understand that some users will be frustrated that they were left out of this deal even if they voted for it.
I have not misunderstood any details. I donāt think the intent of the proposal is bad I just think certain things can be better ironed out.
I donāt think Iām off base to taking issue with the solution to a liquidity problem simply being forking over funds to be controlled by a singular entity who is in the very same proposal advocating a very mercenary approach to attracting other sources of liquidity.
We have very little to gain or lose by voicing any of these concerns, but felt the need to bring some items up for discussion as some comments were echoed by other stakeholders with whom weāve spoken.
Thanks for the valuable feedback!
I appreciate your idealism around the purpose of airdrops, but thatās not what we see. Theyāre often and usually used in some manner of reciprocity already, be it LBP, engaging in on-chain activities, etc.
Using language like pillaging is very disingenuous, especially when you seem open to the same deal without the airdrop, just changing either the custody of funds, or name of the team proposing. ARCH liquidity without other tokens is difficult. Astrovault has the ability to go multi-chain and have multiple hubs, which will interact seamlessly under the same UI. We argue this brings additional value to Archway (which we hope will stay the primary hub), as users can interact seamlessly interchain without even needing deposits/withdrawals.
Not at all! Both are imperative. Which is why I initiated the Liquidity Council. There should be more liquidity than just this! There should STILL be shared managed funds doing other things. This would just make growth happen faster.
We can grow more slowly if thatās everyoneās preference. Or we can speed things up.
Yes it does. In these props nothing is actually offered, and risks still exist. Yes this is a fundamentally different offer. Weāre happy to additionally host liquidity in this style, offering nothing in return as we see here, but would rather share the growth with the Archway community.
Yup. This is a fair concern. We also currently receive 0 delegation from either Phi Labs or the Foundation, which we were okay with. We have volunteered, but would love to do so publicly, that if/when we are number 1 in voting power, we will manually delegate away from our node to ensure decentralization and growth. Even gone as far as to work towards implementing tax brackets that would affect us more than lower nodes.
We currently have less than half of the governance power of the top validator. That is the risk. We are a decentralized business and want to further decentralize, and will always do more than our fair share towards that.
Check our Stats page. Weāve shown what we do with small numbers, the same thing applies to large numbers.
Summary:
I get that you might not like this, or havenāt been around enough to trust our team. Iām glad that youāre engaging! We NEEEEEED more engagement from validators in this ecosystem! Please, stick around more! Contribute! Letās make stuff happen!
Vote however you feel, but please make sure youāre doing so for the betterment of Archway, a blockchain that monetizes blockspace and directly and measurably benefits from Astrovaultās growth in usage and utility.
Yes this is different. Weāve spent years criticizing the way things are currently done, and what we see elsewhere in this ecosystem is still lacking. We believe itās more than fair, but thatās up to governance to decide. Weāre being honest and transparent, and will continue to do so, and as always are happy to hop on calls publicly and/or privately, wherever and whenever to discuss this to and for the entire community.
Yes risks exist, and thank you for helping point them out as you see them. A risk of illiquidity and inactivity trumps most in my opinion.
fair. Please, show up to governance calls! Letās talk things over.
There are multiple ways to skin a cat. This is certainly not the only solution to a liquidity problem, but the one we offered. Whether this passes or fails, we look forward to engaging in many discussions and manners of bettering liquidity on Archway.
Welcome to the forums fam!
Not completely meaningless, but I get your point. Weāre open to ideas, have many, and have purposely not voiced any specifics.
thanks, glad to be here!
Griffin Anderson (Founder) - Posting in my own personal capacity, the following are my personal views and do not represent those of Phi Labs nor the Archway Ecosystem.
With the proposal in its current form, my inclination is to vote No on the proposal. However, Iād like to make it clear that Iām open to considering a modified proposal that addresses some of the concerns Iāve laid out below.
First and foremost, I wholeheartedly support Astrovault and all projects building on Archway. Initially, this proposal seemed promising due to my affinity for Astrovault and the acknowledged need for increased liquidity. However, upon closer examination, certain details raise concerns. While I acknowledge and appreciate the positive contributions Astrovault has made to the Archway community, I have reservations about supporting this proposal in its current form, as I believe it could potentially impact the overall health of the ecosystem. My objective is not to disenfranchise the Astrovault team or incite a large community dispute, but rather to protect the integrity of the Archway protocol and its community. Additionally, I advocate for exploring ways to provide Astrovault with more liquidity, under certain conditions. At this juncture, I believe it is crucial for the community to carefully consider the following.
Here are some concerns:
1. The request is for approximately ~6% of the community poolās treasury as of writing. If this proposal is approved, $750k worth of tokens will be allocated from the community pool, representing approximately ~6% of its total. This allocation would limit the community poolās ability to support other initiatives. I hope the community embraces a long-term and conservative spending perspective for the community pool, acknowledging that this allocation could have a substantial impact on future initiatives.
2. Other chains are receiving a more generous airdrop than the Archway community. Archwayās core contributors have played a vital role in developing Astrovault, and in turn, Astrovault has made significant contributions to the Archway community. At its core, the relationship is long standing. However, based on the diagrams outlined in the Astrovault tokenomics papers, other chains are being offered a more favorable or even similar airdrop proposal compared to what is being proposed for the Archway community. [See Diagrams 1 & 2] ] The diagrams indicate that Astrovault is planning to expand to Injective, Neutron, Terra, Stargaze, Juno, and Cosmos Hub. Although we support cross-chain expansion of apps, Itās not clear as to why the Astrovault team plans to allocate a larger stake in their protocol to other protocols vs. the Archway community. The community has consistently shown strong support in driving activity to Astrovault, whether through Astrovault being the most prominently featured and marketed application, providing funding incentives through Bonus Blocks campaigns, grants, Quadratic Funding, liquidity through the DAO council, fee grants, and more. This is not to undermine Astrovaultās contributions back to the community; however, it raises questions about the decision to potentially weaken this relationship and present another Layer 1 with a more favorable or, for that matter, an equal proposal.
3. The community should prioritize DEXs that choose Archway as their primary home. It remains uncertain whether Astrovault will continue to designate Archway as its home base. From the documentation available, it is evident that the Astrovault team plans to extend support to other Layer 1 blockchains, and I understand the rationale behind this decision; it might be in Astrovaultās communityās best interest. [See diagram 1&2] However, based on conversations with the core team and the documentation, it appears that the Astrovault governance token sale will play a significant role in determining their primary chain or home. Considering that the current token distribution either favors other chains or is evenly distributed across all chains, I am unsure whether allocating ~6% of the community pool to a DEX makes sense, especially if that DEX does not officially support Archway as its primary network.
4. Concentrated validator and voting power. I have openly expressed my goal of achieving a high Nakamoto coefficient and gradually decentralizing the protocol. As a community, I believe we should aim for each validator to hold no more than ~3% of the voting power. It is worth noting that we are actively engaging with the delegators from Chorus One Validator to align voting power. Given Astrovaultās model for staking liquidity in order to tap into the underlying L1 inflation is incredibly powerful and innovative, but it also presents some concentration risk. More liquidity is great, but potentially means more concentration of stake and voting power with a single companyās validator. It remains unclear whether they intend to adhere to a 3% voting power cap. This proposal, if approved, would significantly surpass that cap for the Astrovault validator.
5. Airdrops and Investments should not be conflated nor dependent. When the Archway community airdropped to the Cosmos Hub community, there was no additional request tied to it. The intent was to give back to the core community that has played a crucial role in helping lay the foundation, building the greater ecosystem and core infrastructure the project is built on such as the Cosmos SDK and IBC. Archway didnāt seek funds; rather, it was important to align those who aided us in our initial stages. In my opinion, Iād like to see Astrovault approach the Archway community with the same intent. Separate initiatives should be formulated to support liquidity on Astrovault, but this should be distinct from an airdrop to the community. Finally, I am deeply concerned that this might negatively impact long term liquidity on Astrovault. I can envision a scenario where the liquidity council, foundation, etc., would no longer deposit liquidity into Astrovault without expecting something in return for each deposit, such as more AXV tokens. The overall result would actually be worse for Astrovault because every liquidity injection would now come at a cost to the Astrovault community. The perception may shift from āHow can we unconditionally help Astrovault be successful?ā to a more transactional approach, where every request will be contingent on receiving something in return.
6. The airdrop details are quite vague. Itās unclear what the airdrop requirements will be, including the cap, eligibility criteria, and other specifics. While voting for airdrops may seem appealing, it remains uncertain who qualifies and to what extent they will be eligible. Furthermore, Iād like to better understand the rationale for splitting the unclaimed portion of the airdrop between the Astrovault DAO and Archway? If the request is a swap from Archway to Astrovault, I believe it would make more sense for the entire AXV airdrop to be distributed to the broader Archway community, with no portion being clawed back to the Astrovault DAO if unclaimed.
7. It would be safer for the Archway community to organize this as a community deposit or loan as opposed to tying liquidity provision to an airdrop. The tokens do not appear to go directly to the core contributors; instead, they remain owned by the protocol, essentially functioning as protocol-owned liquidity. However, in practice, they still remain under the ownership and management of the core team, who will have significant control over the Astrovault DAO. What if the core team stops improving the contracts on Archway, or if they opt not to make Archway their home base? What if the protocol-owned liquidity is repurposed for some other use or distributed among AXV governance holders? The current proposal implies that the resources are exclusively designated for liquidity. If thatās the case, the Archway community, in my opinion, should strive to ensure this is the case, even under edge cases. Structuring it as a loan, community liquidity deposit or employing an alternative approach would ensure that Astrovault gets the liquidity while also guaranteeing that if the team decides to cease supporting the Archway community materially, the community retains the ability to withdraw the liquidity and redirect it elsewhere. A win for all, addressing Astrovaultās liquidity issues while also safeguarding community resources.
8. Sets a bad precedent. I am apprehensive that this might establish an unfavorable precedent, encouraging more teams to link airdrops to the receipt of community pool funds. In my opinion, the community pool isnāt the appropriate forum or mechanism for such conditions. To my knowledge, the foundation is striving to equitably distribute resources, supporting current and future teams while ensuring the protocol retains sufficient tokens in reserve for future initiatives. Presently, it has granted over 25 grants to teams building within the ecosystem, with Astrovault being one of the recipients. Both the Juno and Terra communities encountered challenges later by distributing an excess of tokens too swiftly. After many early core teams disengaged and chose not to contribute further, it created issues for the community.
9. AstrovaultDAO could sell this ARCH anytime. Holders of the AXV token could potentially vote on the AstrovaultDAO to sell this ARCH allocation at any time. This is a significant concern, given that the majority of the voting power may end up in the hands of other communities, potentially leading to malicious intent. Itās not clear who AXV holders will be just yet.
Iād support the mechanics of the proposal with the following addressed:
With these conditions met, I personally would encourage the community and liquidity council to deposit more liquidity into Astrovault.
I find the highlighted risks to be fair, and, in my opinion, the proposed modifications seem reasonable as well, achieving the same objectives as outlined in the proposal, while continuing to protect the community.
Griffin
DIAGRAMS
Diagram 1: AXV Distribution | Medium
This diagram highlights several key points. In comparison, other Layer 1 networks are receiving more favorable or comparable airdrop proposals than the Archway community. While the Archway proposal is set at $750k for 5% AXV tokens, another protocol is offered a more advantageous proposal of $1.5M for 13% AXV tokens. This means other chains are getting a better proposal with a larger amount of AXV tokens, potentially influencing Astrovaultās governance decisions.
Diagram 2: https://astrovault.io/whitepaper/econ
This diagram, though possibly hypothetical, indicates that several chains, including Injective and Terra, may receive a larger allocation of AXV tokens than the Archway community as well further reducing the Archway communities influence over the protocol.
Seems like an obvious move! Supporting from our end.
